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Specification models of critical infrastructure focus on parts of a larger environment. However, to consider
the security of critical infrastructure systems, we need approaches for modelling the sum of these parts;
these include people and activities, as well as technology. This paper present human-centered specification
exemplars that capture the nuances associated with interactions between people, technology, and critical
infrastructure environments. We describe requirements each exemplar needs to satisfy, and present
preliminary results developing and evaluating them.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructure (CI), such as the water and rail
sectors, are essential for day-to-day life. However,
despite the attention given to parts of CI systems
– such as water purification for water infrastructure,
or train signalling in rail – there has been little
work modelling the operating environments within
which these parts are situated. Given the unforeseen
circumstances that might arise due to complex
interactions between people, technology, and the
general environment, a security solution mitigating a
risk in one type of CI system, may be inappropriate
for addressing the same risk in another.
Specification exemplars are self-contained, informal
descriptions of a problem in some application
domain, and are designed to capture the harshness
of reality (Feather et al. 1997). They can be used
to promote research and teaching by introducing
interesting and challenging problems, and provide
a common model for evaluating solutions for the
domain associated with the exemplar. Creating
exemplars that address both of these needs can
be difficult. For an exemplar to be useful, it needs
to model different aspects of a problem, model
a problem from different and potentially conflicting
viewpoints, and deal with multiple sources of
information.
Previous work by the authors (Faily et al. 2015) note
that while specification exemplars focus primarily on
modelling functional concerns, the nuances related
to human issues are less easily modelled. By
failing to model such nuances, exemplar users risk
trivialising people and their work. In this paper,
we present work designing and developing human-
centered specification exemplars of nuanced CI
environments. We describe five requirements for
the exemplars before presenting preliminary results
developing and evaluating them.
2. EXEMPLAR DESIGN PRINCIPLES
To address the issues in Section 1, we encapsulated
five requirements into the design of each specifica-
tion exemplar.
First, rather than being a textual description of a
specific setting, each exemplar models the operating
environment of a fictional CI company. Each model
contains a goal model (van Lamsweerde 2009)
representing the company’s security policy and
organisational constraints, asset models (Fléchais
et al. 2003) describing the security properties
associated with each asset, and floor plans of
selected physical locations to provide context to how
people and assets interact.
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Figure 1: CAIRIS generated model of the relationship
between personas, tasks, assets, risks, and attackers
Second, exemplars contain personas (Cooper
1999) of users in each environment, and tasks
describing their typical work. Each task also contains
information about how long it takes a persona to
complete a task, how frequently the task occurs,
how demanding the task is, and what conflicts may
occur between different goals a persona might have.
This information makes it possible to determine the
impact that changing the environment might have
on a persona’s propensity for violating the security
policy.
Third, each exemplar contains a selection of realistic
vulnerabilities, attackers, threats, and risks specific
to the type of CI system being modelled. By
embedding these elements into the exemplar, one
can see how vulnerabilities expose assets, and
attackers realise certain threats to target assets by
exploiting vulnerabilities.
Fourth, although exemplar models are static, model
elements can be varied based on working contexts.
As such, a threat with a high likelihood in one context
may be insignificant or non-existent in another.
Similarly, the same task carried out during the day
might be more or less usable to a persona at
night because the task might be truncated, or more
stressful due to limited support in the event of
problems.
Finally, exemplars are machine readable. For the
purpose of our evaluation, exemplars were modelled
as XML, to be compatible with the CAIRIS security
design tool (Faily 2015). CAIRIS conforms to a meta-
model for usable security (Faily and Fléchais 2010),
enabling it to automatically generate visual models of
how security, usability, and system elements interact
with each other. For example, Figure 1 shows how
tasks (blue ellipses) make use of certain assets
(blue boxes) threatened or exploited by risks (red
ellipses) within a given context of use. The model
also shows the attackers and personas associated
with each task and risk, and how usable personas
find each task (different shades of blue). Although
this model illustrates the complexity resulting from
these different elements, CAIRIS provides facilities
for filtering models, and generating documentation
for some or all of the exemplar model. This allows
exemplar users to focus on some aspect of a larger
problem.
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We developed two specification exemplars conform-
ing to the requirements in Section 2; these are based
on a fictional UK water company (ACME Water),
and a fictional rail company in Southeast Europe
(Balkan Rail). Each exemplar is grounded in em-
pirical data from real CI companies. The data from
ACME Water is drawn from two previous studies
designing security for the water industry (Faily and
Fléchais 2010; Faily and Fléchais 2011), and the
data for Balkan Rail was collected specifically for the
purpose of creating the exemplar. Both specification
exemplars are publicly available (BANCIS Project
Team 2016a,b).
The Balkan Rail exemplar is still under development,
but the ACME Water exemplar provided context
when evaluating a social engineering serious game
(Beckers and Pape 2016). Personas, assets, and
floor layouts were used as part of this game,
where players were expected to devise social
engineering attacks of people at ACME Water.
Although successful, adoption of the exemplar
was initially difficult due to the vast amount of
information in the model. Consequently, when using
the exemplar, one person was designated as a
’plausibility oracle’, and consulted the exemplar in
CAIRIS to determine the impact of proposed attacks
on ACME Water. Future work will present a detailed
evaluation and critical reflection of both exemplars.
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